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INTRODUCTION 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THREE INTERPRETATIONS 
 
The present paper aims at providing an interpretation of the origins of the Schengen Area 
through the analysis of the Italian case. 
In particular, on the basis of unpublished documents of the archives of the European Union 
in Florence and Brussels, French archives, including the French National Archives in Paris and the 
French Diplomatic Archives in Nantes and Italian archives, including the Central Archive of State, 
the Historical Archives of the Chamber of Deputies, the Historical Archives of the Senate and the 
Historical Archives of the Bettino Craxi Foundation in Rome, it intends to answer three distinct but 
closely intertwined questions: what were the main reasons why, between the mid-1980s and the 
early 1990s, a group of member states of the European Community (EC) agreed to abolish internal 
border controls while, simultaneously, transferring them to external borders? why did they decide to 
act outside the framework of the EC? why did they resolve to initially exclude the Southern 
members of the Community? 
In literature three main interpretations of the origins of Schengen were offered. 
The mainstream way of thinking about the emergence of Schengen is provided by Andrew 
Moravcsik, professor of politics and director of the European Union Program at the Princeton 
University. In his “economistic” perspective, Schengen emerged because «the French government, 
concerned that German standards were blocking imports, and the German government, concerned 
that France would close its borders because of balance of payments difficulties, successfully pressed 
for a bilateral Franco-German arrangement to simplify and eventually eliminate border 
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formalities»,1 including border controls on persons; the French and German leaders then agreed to 
include in this arrangement the members of the Benelux Customs Union, including Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg, essentially because of commercial interests. 
The decision to create an area without border controls, related to the parallel decision to 
establish a Common Market at EC level, was in turn part of a strategic game in which France and 
West Germany used the Schengen initiative as “a threat of a two-tier Europe”, a threat mainly 
directed toward the United Kingdom, unwilling to establish a common travel area with continental 
Community countries. 
Although the Moravcsik’s model does not preclude the possibility that more strictly political 
considerations, such as national security, played a role, therefore, it reaches the conclusion that 
economic considerations tied to the emerging European Common Market decisively contributed to 
the emergence of Schengen and that the decision to act outside the context of the EC was primarily 
intended to put pressure on Great Britain.2 
Over all, this hypothesis captures some of the core features that characterize the emergence 
of Schengen, both in terms of process and outcome. Yet the hypothesis is not fully convincing. 
The first problematic element concerns the relationship between the EC and the Schengen 
system. While the European Common Market was conceived and established within the strict 
boundaries of the European Community, the Schengen regime was elaborated not only outside the 
EC framework but also, to a certain extent, in competition with it. As an alternative to the 
Community process, Schengen, despite the cautionary remarks of its proponents, had the potential 
to weaken or even disrupt the EC as the primary mechanism of European integration. 
The second objection concerns the membership of the Schengen system. If, as argued by 
Moravcsik, economic considerations were the primary force behind Schengen, it would have been 
in the interest of the proponent states to include as many EC countries as possible in the Schengen 
system since its inception. On the contrary only five out of the then ten members of the Community 
signed the Schengen Agreement in the mid-1980s. Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark opposed 
stopping border controls because they did not trust effectiveness of continental European countries 
and wanted to maintain sovereignty in this politically sensitive domain. In addition to these 
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  A. MORAVCSIK, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, 
Cornell University Press, New York, 1998, p. 359. 
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 On the same line of reasoning, Jörg Monar, rector of the College of Europe, stressed that the Schengen 
agreements were a direct consequence of the need to complete the European Common Market. The loss of controlling 
possibilities at internal borders, which was implicit in such a strategy, was in turn compensated by common standards, 
procedures and instruments at external borders. See: V. MITSILEGAS, J. MONAR, W. REES, The European Union 
and Internal Security. Guardian of the People?, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke; New York, 2003. See also: J. 
MONAR, The Project of a European Border Guard: Origins, Models and Prospects in the Context of the EU’s 
Integrated External Border Management, in: M. CAPARINI, O. MARENIN (eds.), Borders and Security Governance. 
Managing Borders in a Globalised World, Lit, Zurich; Munich, 2006, pp. 193-194. 
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motives, the determination to remain part of the Nordic Passport Union, a borderless area composed 
of all Scandinavian countries, played a role in the Denmark’s decision as well as the willingness to 
remain member of the Common Travel Area with Great Britain played a part in the Ireland’s 
opposition to borderless areas at European level. Greece and, above all, Italy, however, were clearly 
interested in participating in Schengen and, despite this, they were consciously excluded from it. 
 Although, as previously remarked, Moravcsik provides the mainstream way of thinking 
about the emergence of Schengen, his is not the only attempt to provide an explanation for the 
emergence of the Schengen system which is present in literature. The most relevant alternative, in 
particular, is offered by Didier Bigo, professor of International Relations at King College in London 
and at Sciences-Po in Paris. Drawing on ideas elaborated by the sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and 
Michel Foucault, the French scholar presents the border control domain in Europe as embedded in 
an emerging “security field”. Here the focus is on political strategies involving the increasing 
salience of border control and the emphasis is on the symbolic value of the common European 
frontiers as protection against danger.3  
 According to Bigo, in particular, the origins of the Schengen agreements should be sought in 
the activities of practitioners with a specialization in the security field across Europe, including 
police officials, border guards and security consultants. These security entrepreneurs played upon 
the collective anxieties and insecurities of European citizens regarding the immigration of non-
Community nationals, the ultimate aim being to gain more power and visibility. That said, the 
security field is not defined by a master plan; rather, it is shaped by the unintended consequences of 
these actors’ practices. By producing and reproducing fear, these practitioners created the 
conditions for the establishment of a new “Europeanized” field of security.4 
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 See: D. BIGO, Polices en réseaux: l’expérience europeéenne, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences 
Politiques, Paris, 1996. See also: D. BIGO, Liaison officers in Europe: new officers in the European security field, in: J. 
W. E. SHEPTYCKI (ed.), Issues in Transnational Policing, Routledge, London; New York, 2000, pp. 67-99; D. BIGO, 
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 This interpretation gets important points, but it is our contention that it is not able to offer a 
compelling account of the emergence of the Schengen regime. 
 The first problematic aspect concerns the geographical dimension of border controls. When 
the new governance of borders emerged, the institutional context defining the border domain in 
Europe was overwhelmingly state-centric, as well as the security entrepreneurs were essentially 
state-minded. Therefore there was no ideal environment where Europe-wide norms could flourish. 
Rather than its original source, this normative context seems more a consequence of the process 
leading to the emergence of Schengen. 
 The second objection concerns the role of actors in the Schengen decision making process. 
Bigo relies on security practitioners’ activities as the driving force behind the establishment of 
Schengen. These actors, however, were dragged into the initiative, rather than actively supporting 
it; also, among practitioners there were divisions and many of them were bitterly opposed to 
Schengen and its underlying philosophy. In addition, it should be noted that the process leading to 
the creation of Schengen was mainly decided at high political levels by key national decision 
makers; even if we grant that security practitioners played a role in this process, it is not clear how 
they convinced decision makers to adopt their views, and how they acquired these assumptions in 
the first place. Incidentally, at least initially, the Schengen system was negotiated by officials of 
Foreign Ministries, traditionally less familiar with security practitioners. Bigo also does not explain 
why Schengen and not, for example, a Communitarian option within the European Union was 
chosen. 
 More recently, Ruben Zaiotti, professor of Political Science and Director of the European 
Union Centre of Excellence at the Dalhousie University, elaborated an alternative, sophisticated, 
theory. The gist of his argument is that the emergence of the Schengen regime should be 
conceptualized in terms of the evolution of the culture of border control in which members of 
Europe’s border control community are embedded. According to Zaiotti, in particular, the Schengen 
regime was the result of a historical transition from a nationalist approach to the management of 
borders to a post-national culture of border control. Seen in this light, the emergence of a new 
border control regime in Europe can be understood in the context of the evolution from one culture 
of border control, the “Westphalian” one, to another, the “Schengen” one, which represents a 
substantial pos-tnational reformulation of traditional strictly national notions of sovereignty and 
territoriality in Europe.5 
 While promising and inspiring, also this hypothesis has, in our opinion, significant 
shortcomings. 
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 R. ZAIOTTI, Cultures of Border Control. Schengen and the Evolution of European Frontiers, The University 
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 As all culturalist explanations for complex economic or political phenomena normally do, it 
evades questions as to what the real motives behind actors’ behaviour are. In this sense, the cultural 
change which is associated with the emergence of Schengen seems more the consequence than the 
cause of the change in the migration regime which occurred in Europe between the mid-1980s and 
the early 1990s. 
 Moreover, the cultural change itself should not be overestimated. Without any doubts, the 
Schengen border control regime broke with traditional approaches to territorial governance, as 
reflected in the invention of the notion of a common external border, in the establishment of new 
trans-governmental modes through which European governments operate and in the mix of trans-, 
inter- and supranational institutional contexts where European governments carry out their 
functions. Yet, there are many evidences that the Schengen system was not intended by its founding 
members as a way to give up their sovereignty over border control but as a way to share it in order 
to make it more effective and less expensive. In this sense, despite appearances, the Schengen 
system can not be considered as a nation state’s retreat from border management but, on the 
contrary, as a nation state’s attempt to regain control over it. 
 
 
THE ORIGINS OF THE SCHENGEN AGREEMENTS 
SEEN THROUGH THE LENS OF THE ITALIAN CASE 
 
 As it is well known, since the early and especially mid-1950s, all the member states of the 
EC apart from Italy experienced mass immigration, largely in response to the pull of high growth 
economies which desperately needed cheap labour from poorer countries of periphery, especially in 
the Mediterranean region. Although the phenomenon of illegal immigration was even then 
widespread,6 a significant part of such a movement of labour from South to North occurred within 
the framework of bilateral migration agreements through which, in particular, France recruited 
manpower from Italy (1946; 1951), Greece (1954), Morocco (1962), Algeria (1962; 1964; 1968; 
1971), Portugal (1963), Tunisia (1963), Yugoslavia (1965) and Turkey (1965), the Federal Republic 
of Germany recruited workers from Italy (1955), Greece (1960), Spain (1960), Turkey (1961; 1971-
1972), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968), Belgium recruited 
manpower from Italy (1946), Morocco (1963), Turkey (1964), Tunisia (1969) and Algeria (1970) 
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and the Netherlands recruited workers from Italy (1948), Turkey (1964), Morocco (1969) and 
Tunisia (1971).7 
 At that early stage, the EC hardly played any role, migration relations being smoothly 
conducted at bilateral/national level. 
 But what started as an apparently efficient transfer of labour from poorer countries in the 
South to richer countries in the North became a political, social and economic liability between the 
late 1960s and the early 1970s; this change in perceptions, in turn, led to a dramatic shift from 
liberal to restrictive migration policies in all European immigration countries. 
 The debate over the motives behind this change is still open. 
 Generally speaking, we can say that there are two main schools of thought. 
 On the one hand, a group of scholars emphasize political factors.8 According to them, the 
transition from European to African and Asian migrants, which was a consequence of 
improvements in the economic conditions of Southern European countries and, at the same time, the 
lengthy and dramatic crisis affecting most former European colonies in the so-called Third World, 
contributed to a rise in opposition to immigration in European receiving countries; as cultural and 
ethnic diversity increased and, consequently, anti-immigrants sentiments resurfaced within 
European societies, political leaderships realized that there was the need to contain further 
immigration and, at the same time, to make further efforts to integrate immigrants, the ultimate aim 
being to preserve social cohesion and harmony. According to a minority in this group of scholars, 
another political event was even more influential in determining the U-turn in European migration 
policies.9 The surprisingly active role played by foreign workers in the protests that swept through 
Northern European industries between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, in particular, alarmed 
most employers who had benefited of the docility of immigrant employees; as a result, even before 
the economic crisis in the mid-1970s, they began to mistrust immigrant workforce and, accordingly, 
to reduce the request for further foreign workers. 
                                                 
7  S. CASTLES, M. J. MILLER, The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern 
World, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 68-78. 
8 See: J. F. HOLLIFIELD, L’immigration et l’Etat-Nation à la recherche d’un modèle national, L’Harmattan, 
Paris; Montreal, 1997. See also: J. F. HOLLIFIELD, Immigration and the politics of rights: the French case in 
comparative perspective, in: M. BOMMES, A. GEDDES (eds.), Immigration and Welfare. Challenging the borders of 
the welfare state, Routledge, London; New York, 2000, pp. 109-113; J. F. HOLLIFIELD, Immigration and integration 
in Western Europe: a comparative analysis, in: E. M. UÇARER, D. J. PUCHALA, Immigration into Western Societies: 
problems and policies, Pinter, London; Washington, 1997, pp. 28-41. 
9 See: U. ASCOLI, Movimenti migratori in Italia, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1979; A. SERAFINI, L’operaio 
multinazionale in Europa, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1974. See also: P. BASSO, F. PEROCCO, Gli immigrati in Europa, in: 
P. BASSO, F. PEROCCO (eds.), Gli immigrati in Europa: diseguaglianze, razzismo, lotte, Franco Angeli, Milano, 
2003, pp. 6-7. 
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 On the other hand, a group of scholars put emphasis on economic factors;10 this view is 
prevalent in literature. According to them, as growth rates slowed, and unemployment rates 
increased, in consequence of the 1973 Oil Shock, the need for further immigrants simply ceased; as 
a consequence, employers stopped to insist on liberal immigration policies, trade unions voiced 
concern about the conditions of local workforce and political leaders tried to preserve social peace 
and consensus by preventing fresh immigration. 
 Regardless of motives, what it is sure is that, between the early and the mid-1970s, all the 
receiving member states of the EC unilaterally decided to stop the recruitment of foreign workers 
and to encourage voluntary repatriation of immigrants; in exchange, efforts were stepped up to 
incorporate foreigners already settled in the host societies, also by expanding family reunification 
opportunities.11 
 In the same period when its member states were closing down their respective borders to 
non-Community workers, the EC, under pressure from Arab leaderships, began to include migration 
issues in its nascent foreign policy, especially its Mediterranean policy.12 Since they were no more 
allowed to negotiate exportation of surplus manpower to European labour markets, the governments 
of Mediterranean sending countries began to reorder priorities in favour of socio-economic 
integration of emigrants and to bring this issue to the agenda of the main bilateral and multilateral 
fora at Euro-Mediterranean level.  
                                                 
10 See: M. LIVI BACCI, In cammino. Breve storia delle migrazioni, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2010; J. HUYSMANS, 
The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, migration and asylum in the EU, Routledge, Abingdon; New York, 2006. See also: D. 
BIGO, Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control?, in: D. BIGO, E. GUILD (eds.), Controlling 
Frontiers. Free Movement Into and Within Europe, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2005, pp. 59-85.  
11 Unlike European receiving countries, which experienced convergent evolution in their migration policies, the 
main sending countries in the Mediterranean region pursued different strategies. While Algeria unilaterally suspended 
emigration to France in 1973 and turned to policies of national economic development to substitute exportation of 
workers in Western Europe, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey adopted different combinations of economic development 
policies and, in order to diversify migration destinations, new active emigration policies; as a result, significant migrant 
flows from these states headed towards Southern European countries, including Italy and Spain, and petroleum 
producing countries in North Africa, including Libya, and in the Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia. S. 
COLLINSON, Europe and international migration, Pinter Publishers for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
London; New York, 1994, pp. 64-80. 
12 See: F. BICCHI, European foreign policy making toward the Mediterranean, Palgrave Macmillan, New York; 
Basingstoke, 2007; J. NIESSEN, F. MOCHEL, EU external relations and international migration, Migration Policy 
Group, Brussels, 1999; J.-F. DREVET, La Méditerranée, nouvelle frontière pour l’Europe des Douze?, Karthala, Paris, 
1986. See also: E. CALANDRI, L’eterna incompiuta: la politica mediterranea tra sviluppo e sicurezza, in: E. 
CALANDRI, Il primato sfuggente. L’Europa e l’intervento per lo sviluppo (1957-2007), FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2009, 
pp. 89-117; A. BIN, L’Europa e la sicurezza nel Mediterraneo, in: F. ATTINÀ, F. LONGO, Unione europea e 
Mediterraneo fra globalizzazione e frammentazione, Cacucci, Bari, 1996, pp. 91-94; S. HENIG, Mediterranean policy 
in the context of the external relations of the European Community 1958-1973, in: A. SCHLAIM, G. N. 
YANNOPOULOS, The Eec and the Mediterranean countries, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, pp. 305-
324. 
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 This item was thus pushed into the centre of the Euro-Arab Dialogue,13 where, between 
1975 and 1978, representatives from the EC and the Arab League discussed 
 
the problems of the migrant workers and particularly the Arab workers in countries of the European 
Economic Community. [They] referred to the importance of considering the topic of the Arab workers in 
Europe, especially its human aspects considering labour as a human value in the first place, and the role that 
can be played by the Arab workers in the field of cultural contacts and economic development.14 
 
 In this context, representatives from the EC and the Arab League committed themselves to 
exchanging views, information and data concerning the employment situation, working and living 
conditions and social security schemes of respective migrants; though they did not achieve any 
concrete results, they also made serious efforts to contribute to the solution of the problem of the 
training of Arab workers in Europe and Arab workers returning to countries of origin. More 
importantly, despite relevant divergences of opinion which undermined the political and juridical 
significance of the final document,15 in late 1978 in Damascus they adopted a “Declaration on the 
principles concerning working and living conditions of migrant workers”, which recognized some 
generic rights for Arab migrants residing in EC countries.16 
 Also, migration issues were widely discussed in the negotiations for the cooperation 
agreements that were signed in 1976 by the EC and Algeria, the EC and Morocco, the EC and 
Tunisia and the EC and Turkey within the framework of the Global Mediterranean Policy. In the 
third chapter of all these four agreements, “Cooperation in the sector of labour”, the member states 
of the EC committed themselves to respecting the principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality regarding working conditions and remuneration of Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian and 
Turkish workers residing in their respective territories; at the same time, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia 
and Turkey committed themselves to respecting the principle of non-discrimination based on 
                                                 
13 I. SABRI ABDALLAH, La place du Dialogue euro-arabe dans les relations internationales contemporaines, 
in: J. BOURRINET, Le Dialogue euro-arabe, Economica, Paris, 1979, pp. 115-129. 
14 Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes [hereafter: ADN], Ambassade à Tunis [hereafter: AT], 164 711PO A, 
République Française – Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Direction des Affaires Politiques, Note: Dialogue euro-
arabe, Paris, 30.07.1975. 
15 Unlike Arab representatives, European representatives opposed any reference to international conventions that 
were not ratified by all the EC countries, opposed specific and binding provisions and supported the introduction of 
safeguard clauses stating that the application of all principles should be subject, on the one hand, to public order, safety 
and public health and, on the other hand, to national laws. ADN, AT, 164 711PO A, République Française – Ministère 
des Affaires Étrangères. Direction des Affaires Consulaires, Réunion à Tunis du groupe de travail spécialisé euro-arabe 
“Affaires culturelles et sociales” (28-31 octobre 1976), Tunis, 31.10.1976. 
16 ADN, AT, 165 711PO A, République Française – Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Dialogue Euro-Arabe, 
Note: Situation du dialogue euro-arabe, Paris, 25.05.1979. 
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nationality regarding working conditions and remuneration of workers from EC countries residing 
in their respective territories.17 
 While the receiving countries in the EC were closing frontiers to non-Community workers 
and, together with the EC, were making efforts to integrate migrants already settled in their 
territories, demand-pull forces were rapidly giving way to supply-push forces in the third 
Mediterranean countries; as populations began to grow at a rapid pace and economies began to 
weaken in all non-petroleum-producing countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East, it became 
more and more difficult for the member states of the EC to contain migration flows from the South. 
The struggle to win civil and social rights for marginal groups, including ethnic minorities and 
foreigners, and the institutionalization of those rights in the jurisprudence of liberal-republican 
states, in addition, made it impossible for receiving countries in the EC simply to militarise their 
respective borders or to expel or deport all unwanted migrants. Inadvertently, the result of trying to 
slam the front door of legal immigration shut thus led to the opening of side doors, including family 
reunification, illegal immigration and false refugee claim.18 
In this context, after a series of contacts between French President François Mitterrand and 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the French Secretary of State for European Affairs, Roland 
Dumas, and the Head of the German Chancellery, Waldemar Schreckenberger, agreed upon the 
Saarbrücken Accord. The agreement, signed on July 13, 1984, envisioned the immediate abolition 
of control on persons and the easing of control on vehicles; on the other hand, it envisioned the 
transfer of these controls to the external borders, the harmonization of visa policies and legislation 
on foreigners, drugs, arms and passport delivery and the strengthening of police and customs 
cooperation. 
 The Italian government, on initiative of the Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti, immediately 
expressed the desire to reach a similar agreement with France.19 
The Laurent Fabius government, however, dropped the request. In the opinion of the 
officials of the French Interior Ministry, Italy was pursuing a lax immigration policy, which made it 
the most important transit country for illegal immigration coming from Yugoslavia, Turkey, the 
Maghreb countries, including Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, and sub-Saharan African countries, 
                                                 
17 F. MARTINES, The cooperation agreements with Maghreb countries: a contribution to the study of 
consistency of EEC development cooperation policy, European University Institute, Florence, 1994, pp. 37-53. 
18 See: T. BALE, Immigration and Integration Policy in Europe. Why Politics – and the Centre-Right – Matter, 
Routledge, London; New York, 2009; R. COHEN, Z. LAYTON-HENRY, The Politics of Migration, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham Glos, 1997; M. PACINI, Italia, Europa e nuove migrazioni, Edizioni della Fondazione 
Giovanni Agnelli, Torino, 1990. 
19  G.-H. SOUTOU, L'Italie et le "couple" franco-allemand, in: P. CRAVERI, A. VARSORI (eds.), L'Italia nella 
costruzione europea. Un bilancio storico (1957-2007), FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2009, p. 60. 
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especially Senegal, to France;20 according to the officials of the French Ministry for External 
Relations, 800,000 undocumented immigrants who then lived in the peninsula were already 
potentially ready to cross the Alps into France.21 In addition, the officers of both the French 
Ministry for External Relations and the French Interior Ministry were concerned that the abolition 
of border controls with Italy might unwillingly encourage influx of Italian inactive and unemployed 
persons and, more importantly, might favour international terrorism and criminal traffics, including 
counterfeit money, artwork, stolen car and drug smuggling, into the French territory.22 Without 
cooperation between border guards, a drastic tightening of its own immigration policy and, more 
importantly, a readmission agreement with France, Italy could not hope to form a borderless area 
with its Northern neighbour.23 
 Soon after the signature of the Saarbrücken Accord, the Benelux countries began to show 
interest in the project and, at the conclusion of brief negotiations, on June 14, 1985, the French 
Secretary of State for European Affairs, Catherine Lalumière, the Head of German Chancellery, 
Waldemar Schreckenberger, the Dutch Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Willem Frederik van 
Eekelen, the Belgian Secretary of State for European Affairs, Paul De Keersmaeker, and the 
Luxembourgian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Robert Goebbels, signed the so-called 
Schengen Agreement24. Modelled on the Saarbrücken Accord, this agreement provided for the 
removal of internal border controls, while simultaneously introducing measures to strengthen 
external border controls and to fight against drug-trafficking, international crime and illegal 
immigration. 
Whereas the governments in London, Dublin and Copenhagen were notoriously opposed to 
Schengen-like agreements, the government in Athens was potentially interested in them; yet, it was 
                                                 
20 ADN, Consulat Général à Florence (hereafter: CGF), 227 PO 1 291, République Française - Ministère de 
l'Intérieur, Note à l'attention de Monsieur Charasse, Conseiller Technique au Cabinet du Ministre. Objet: Réflexions sur 
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23 ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 137, Ministère des Relations Extérieures. Direction d'Europe. S/Direction d'Europe 
Méridionale, A/S: Éventuel allègement des contrôles à la frontière, Paris, 22.10.1984; ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 137, 
République Française - Ministère des Relations Extérieures. Direction d'Europe. S/Direction d'Europe Méridionale, 
A/S: Cadre général des relations franco-italiennes, Paris, 19.10.1984; ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 137, République Française 
- Ministère des Relations Extérieures. Direction des Affaires Économiques et Financières. Affaires Générales, A/S: 
Passages à la frontière Franco-Italienne, Paris, 18.10.1984. 
24 Le Soir, 14.6.1985; Le Républicain Lorrain, 15.6.1985; Le Figaro, 16.6.1985. 
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not even taken into consideration since Greece was then a newcomer to the European Community 
which, in addition, was still an emigration country at the far periphery of the EC. 25  
Italy was thus the only great excluded from the accord. 
 The President of the Italian Council of Ministers, Bettino Craxi, was so concerned about this 
issue that he insisted on putting it at the top of the agenda in the summit with French President 
Mitterrand, which took place in Florence the same day on which the Schengen Agreement was 
signed.26 Under Craxi's pressure, Mitterrand agreed on bilateral negotiations aimed at reaching a 
quasi Schengen arrangement between Italy and France, making peremptorily clear, however, that 
Rome first needed to strengthen controls on persons that tried to illegally enter France through Italy, 
especially from the Mediterranean region.27 What clearly emerged was a basic disagreement over 
the role of the EC and, more importantly, the perception of the Mediterranean region. Craxi was 
convinced that the EC was the appropriate framework for dealing with the liberalization of cross-
border movement of persons and that the European Community should develop a generous 
immigration policy, consistent with its moral responsibilities and political interests in the 
Mediterranean region; this attitude went hand in hand with the Italy’s renewed Mediterranean 
ambitions, which implied a greater role in the Middle East, Malta and the Maghreb region, 
including Algeria, Libya and Tunisia.28 On the contrary, preoccupied with the political and electoral 
rise of the anti-immigration National Front (National Front, NF) and the sharp increase of the risk 
of terrorist attacks in France,29 Mitterrand was of the opinion that any prospect of 
Communitarisation of the Schengen policy and any enlargement of the Schengen group should be 
subordinated to the preliminary tightening of immigration policies, the ultimate aim being to protect 
Europe and, in particular, France from unwanted immigration from South. 
                                                 
25 See: P. BOELES, M. DEN HEIJER, G. LODDER, K. WOUTERS, European Migration Law, Intersentia, 
Antwerp, 2009; S. K. KARANJA, Transparency and Proportionality in the Schengen Information System and Border 
Control Co-operation, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008; G. SCIORTINO, L’ambizione della frontiera. Le politiche di controllo 
migratorio in Europa, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2000; V. HREBLAY, Les accords de Schengen: origine, fonctionemment, 
avenir, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1998; J. S. LOUTTE, Les États du Benelux et la France face aux accords de Schengen, 
Centre de recherche et d’information socio-politiques, Bruxelles, 1998; S. BELLUCCI, L’Europa senza frontiere e le 
nuove misure di cooperazione tra polizie, Laurus Robuffo, Roma, 1997; G. RENAULT, Schengen. Un modèle pour 
l’Europe pénale?, Maison Larcier, Bruxelles, 1995.  
26 ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 291, République Française - Ministère des Relations Extérieures. Direction d’Europe. 
Sous-Direction d’Europe Méridionale, Note de cadrage. A/S: Sommet franco-italien (Florence, 13 et 14 juin 1985), 
Paris, 24.05.1985. 
27 Financial Times, 15.06.1985. 
28 ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 291, République Française - Ministère des Relations Extérieures. Direction d’Afrique du 
Nord et du Moyen Orient. Afrique du Nord, L’Italie et le Maghreb, Paris, 23.05.1985; ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 291, 
République Française - Ministère des Relations Extérieures. Direction d’Europe. Sous-Direction d’Europe Méridionale, 
Politique étrangère de l’Italie, Paris, 05.06.1985.  
29 ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 291, République Française - Ministère des Relations Extérieures. Direction des Français 
à l'Étranger et des Étrangers en France. Sous-Direction des Étrangers en France, A/S: Circulation des personnes: 
Immigration clandestine, Paris, 05.1985. 
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Shortly after the summit in Florence, representatives from the Italian Foreign Ministry 
headed by Andreotti and from the French Ministry for External Relations headed by Dumas entered 
into negotiations to come to an agreement but, after months of fruitless discussions, talks came to an 
abrupt halt in early 1986.  
As shown by both Italian and French primary sources, the main cause for the breakdown in 
negotiations was the Italian government's refusal to acquiesce to the requests for change made by 
French representatives on behalf of all the member states of the Schengen Agreement. On the one 
hand, Italian authorities were reluctant to pay the political and financial cost of removing from 
legislation the special clauses of the Geneva Convention in which the status of political asylum was 
only recognized for asylum seekers from Eastern European Communist countries;30 this request was 
due to the willingness of the Schengen countries, especially West Germany, to share the increasing 
burden of refugee flows from Africa and Asia. Second, they opposed signing a readmission 
agreement with France whereby Italy had to readmit irregular migrants transiting from Italy to 
France31 and, more importantly, conforming its own immigration legislation to the stricter ones 
adopted by all the original members of the Schengen Agreement between the early 1970s and the 
mid-1980s.32 In addition to questioning the feasibility and effectiveness of both stricter border 
controls and new penalties on carriers transporting undocumented foreigners,33 in particular, the 
government in Rome staunchly rejected the French call for the introduction of visa requirements for 
nationals of all emigration or potential emigration countries. While both the French government and 
Presidency regarded visas as potent antidotes to illegal immigration and international terrorism,34 
                                                 
30 Archivi Storici della Fondazione Bettino Craxi [hereafter: ASFBC], Fondo Bettino Craxi [hereafter: FBC], 4A, 
Repubblica italiana - Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Consiglio Europeo (Londra, 5-6/12/1986). Libera circolazione delle 
persone nella Comunità. Nota informativa, Roma, 11.1986. 
31 According to the officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry, the Schengen Agreement «was conceived of, 
especially by France, as a means of pressure against Italy in order to solve, possibly with profit, the problem of 
repatriation of illegal immigrants to their countries of origin» [Translated by the Author]. ASFBC, FBC, 4A, 
Repubblica italiana - Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Consiglio Europeo (Londra, 5-6/12/1986). Libera circolazione delle 
persone nella Comunità. Nota informativa, Roma, 11.1986.  
32 According to the officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry, the real reason why the Schengen countries signed an 
intergovernmental agreement rather than adopting a EC directive was their conviction that «the other members of the 
Community (above all Italy) were not sufficiently able to ensure a serious control over common external borders» 
[Translated by the Author]. ASFBC, FBC, 12B, Repubblica italiana - Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Consiglio Europeo 
(Londra, 5-6/12/1986). Europa dei cittadini. Cooperazione in materia di libera circolazione delle persone, Roma, 
11.1986.  
33 ASFBC, FBC, ALL12, Repubblica italiana - Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Seguiti riunione interministeriale sul 
soggiorno dei cittadini CEE, snellimento controlli frontiere intracomunitarie e proposta tedesca sull'ingresso illegale di 
extra-comunitari provenienti con navi e aerei, Roma, 14.11.1986. 
34 Claude Cheysson, French Foreign Minister between 1981 and 1984, was the first to draw up a plan to extend 
visa requirements; the plan, however, was abandoned because of the protests from sending countries, especially in the 
Maghreb and francophone sub-Saharan Africa. R. LEVEAU, Migrations et imaginaires sociaux: l’épreuve de la guerre 
du Golfe, in: B. BADIE, C. WIHTOL DE WENDEN (eds.), Le défi migratoire. Questions de relations internationales, 
Presses de la Fondation Nationale, Paris, 1994, pp. 127-139. After the French legislative election in 1986, which saw 
the rise of the National Front and the victory of the Rally of the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République, 
RPR)/Union for French Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie Française, UDF) coalition, the new French Prime 
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the Italian government argued for continuing to exempt a number of Third World countries, 
especially in the Mediterranean basin, from visa requirements; according to Italian authorities, the 
expansion of visa requirements, in addition to being ineffective in dealing with illegal immigration 
and international terrorism, was a contradiction to the internationalist values of the country and its 
main political and social forces, a hindrance to both tourism to Italy and pilgrimage to the Vatican 
City and, what was worse, an obstacle to the Mediterranean strategy of the government.35 
In coincidence with the fall of Craxi cabinet in mid-1987, however, the government in Rome 
realized that it was too costly, in both political and economic terms, to continue to stay on the 
margins of the Schengen club, also because this might contribute to transform Italy from a transit 
country, as it was still perceived by a large part of its ruling class and public opinion,36 to a 
receiving country. Moreover, after a rebuffed attempt of alliance with Spain, Italy faced the serious 
risk of being diplomatically isolated in Europe; unlike the Italian one,37 in fact, the Spanish 
Parliament was prompt to bring national immigration legislation in line with the more restrictive 
regimes enforced in the signatories of the Schengen Agreement, even if it remained reluctant to 
impose visa requirements on citizens of Maghreb and South American countries.38 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Minister, Jacques Chirac, the new French Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua, and the French Foreign Minister, Jean-
Bernard Raimond, carried the idea of visa requirements to extremes, by deciding to impose visas on all the countries of 
the world apart from Switzerland and Community countries. ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 39, République Française - 
Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Direction des Français à l'Étranger et des Étrangers en France. Sous-Direction des 
Étrangers en France, A/S: Extension du régime du visa de court séjour, Paris, 07.11.1986. As remarked in a confidential 
note approved by French Foreign Minister Raimond, the aim was to contribute to the fight against international 
terrorism and illegal immigration from Maghreb and francophone sub-Saharan African countries without undermining 
bilateral relations: «la décision prise le 16 septembre 1986 de généraliser l’obligation de visa de court séjour à tous les 
pays du monde, à l’exception de ceux de la CEE et de la Suisse, répondait à une préoccupation essentielle, celle de 
mieux lutter contre les actions terroristes qui frappaient alors directement notre territoire. Elle a également permis de 
mieux contrôler les flux migratoires en provenance de pays dont, souvent, les ressortissants entraient librement sur notre 
sol en raison de leurs liens historiques avec nous. Il est tout à fait clair que c’est le caractère universel de la mesure qui a 
permis de faire admettre le visa aux pays du Maghreb et de l’Afrique francophone, sans que ceux-ci le ressentent 
comme une discrimination intolérable». ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 205, République Française - Ministère des Affaires 
Étrangères. Le Directeur des Français à l'Étranger et des Étrangers en France, A/S: Note d'information: les visas, Paris, 
13.01.1988. 
35 A. MELONI, Visa Policy within the European Union Structure, Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg, 2006, pp. 38-39. 
36 K. CALAVITA, Immigrants at the Margins. Law, Race, and Exclusion in Southern Europe, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 4. 
37 See: C. BONIFAZI, L’immigrazione straniera in Italia, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2007; E. PUGLIESE, L’Italia tra 
migrazioni internazionali e migrazioni interne, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2006. See also: K. CALAVITA, Italy: Economic 
Realities, Political Fictions, and Policy Failures, in: W. A. CORNELIUS, T. TSUDA, P. L. MARTIN, J. F. 
HOLLIFIELD (eds.), Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, pp. 
366-369; P. BONETTI, Italy, in: B. NASCIMBENE (ed.), Expulsion and Detention of Aliens in the European Union 
Countries, Giuffré, Milano, 2001, pp. 314-315; G. SCIORTINO, Planning in the Dark: the Evolution of Italian 
Immigration Control, in: G. BROCHMANN, T. HAMMAR (eds.), Mechanisms of Immigration Control. A 
Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies, Berg, Oxford; New York, 1999, pp. 237-239; M. CONTEL, R. 
DE BIASE, Italy, in: S. ANGENENDT, Asylum and Migration Policies in the European Union, Research Institute of 
the German Society for Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 1999, pp. 236-237; G. ZINCONE, Immigration to Italy: Data and 
Policies, in: F. HECKMANN, W. BOSSWICK (eds.), Migration Policies: a Comparative Perspective, Enke, Stuttgard, 
1995, p. 138. 
38 See: A. CORTÉS MAISONAVE, Los antecedentes políticos del codesarrollo: la reinvención del nexo entre la 
migración y el desarrollo en el sur de Europa, in: F. CHECA Y OLMOS, J. C. CHECA, A. ARJONA (eds.), Las 
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After a short internal debate, on initiative of Foreign Minister Andreotti, the Italian 
government agreed on asking for admittance to the groups charged with drafting the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement, well aware that the governments of the five original 
signatories of the Schengen Agreement had not intention to give up their requests.39  
Unsurprisingly, the governments of the Schengen countries accepted the Italian request, the 
aims being to reassure the European Commission and the European Parliament that the Schengen 
Agreement moved towards the inclusion of all the members of the EC and to contribute to a 
politically and financially convenient externalization of border control activities.40 Their line, 
however, remained that Italy should meet all the conditions and remove all the obstacles for 
acceptance into the Schengen club;41 this strictness, incidentally, was also due to the fact that the 
Italian case set the precedent for all Southern European cases, including the Greek, Portuguese and 
Spanish ones.42 
In addition, Italian ministers were excluded from biannual ministerial meetings that took 
place in the framework of the negotiations for the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement whereas Italian representatives attending technical committees were admitted as mere 
observers without any decision making capacity.43  
After one year and half of second-class participation in negotiations, the time came for the 
Italian Parliament to discuss the opportunity of entering the Schengen system and accordingly 
adapting the national immigration legislation to the Schengen requirements. Between late 1988 and 
late 1989, the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies 
conducted an enquiry into immigration and conditions of foreign people, which highlighted the 
existence of a vast majority of political and social forces opposing the Italian participation in the 
upcoming Schengen area. With the only exceptions of Foreign Minister and, since mid-1989, 
president of the Council of Ministers Andreotti and Interior Minister Antonio Gava, all the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Migraciones en el Mundo: desafíos y esperanzas, Icaria, Barcelona, 2009, p. 75; F. J. MORENO FUENTES, 
Dissonance between Discourse and Practice in EU Border Control Enforcement. The Spanish Case, in: A. CHEBEL 
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Perspective, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, 2008, pp. 262-267. 
39 Historical Archives of the Council of the European Union (hereafter: HACEU), Schengen Executive 
Committee (hereafter: SEC), 230487, Ambassade d’Italie à Bruxelles, Lettre au Secrétariat Général du Benelux, 
Bruxelles, 13.04.1987; HACEU, SEC, 230487, Union Économique Benelux – Ministère des Affaires Économiques (La 
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d’information socio-politiques, Bruxelles, 1998, pp. 11-16. 
42 N. GUIMEZANES, La Convention de Schengen: une présentation française, in: A. PAULY (ed.), Schengen 
en panne, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 1994, pp. 5-10. 
43 M. FRIDEGOTTO, L’accordo di Schengen: riflessi internazionali ed interni per l’Italia, FrancoAngeli, 
Milano, 1992, pp. 17-20. 
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members of associations, trade unions, parliamentary groups and government who spoke during 
hearings criticized the Schengen Agreement and opposed the Italian accession to it on the basis of 
its alleged incompatibility with national interests and values.44 
As to government members, in particular, the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, 
Claudio Martelli, bluntly attacked the essence of the Schengen Agreement, denouncing it as an 
inhuman and ineffective attempt to establish a cordon sanitaire directed against the South whose 
poverty was, according to him, largely attributable to the North. In alternative to the Schengen 
system, Martelli proposed the strategic planning of migration flows at the level of the EC and in 
close coordination with the countries of origin; according to this proposal, in particular, the 
European Community ought to set a flexible and articulated framework within which all its member 
states, on the basis of their respective socio-economic needs and in a spirit of international 
solidarity, would plan the quotas of immigrants to be admitted each term and sign bilateral 
agreements with sending countries. 
With this in mind, in late 1989 Martelli introduced a bill to reform the Italian immigration 
policy in a way that was explicitly distinct from the immigration policies adopted by the Schengen 
countries; according to Martelli, in particular, Italy should not follow the model of France, which 
was then «shaken by waves of racism and characterized by a foreign population that is five times 
larger than ours».45 
After the approval of Martelli's decree law by the Council of Ministers, however, a heated 
debate emerged, in which the distance between Italian and Northern European immigration regimes 
became a fundamental argument in the hands of the opponents of Martelli's approach.46 At a time 
when long-standing fears of immigrant invasion from the South combined with more recent fears of 
a looming immigrant invasion from the East, significant national political forces began to openly 
criticize the liberal approach taken by the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, borrowing the 
definitions of Italy as the soft underbelly and the open door of Europe from French and German 
media and political discourses.47  
Moreover, the governments of the Schengen countries did not hesitate to put direct and 
indirect pressure on both the Italian government and Parliament to accept their views on 
immigration, with the Schengen agreements being used as a sort of blackmail. The French 
                                                 
44 CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI, Immigrazione e condizione dello straniero. Indagine conoscitiva della I 
Commissione Affari Costituzionali e Testi normativi conseguenti (novembre 1988-dicembre 1989), Ufficio 
Pubblicazioni del Servizio Informazione Parlamentare e Relazioni Esterne della Camera dei Deputati, Roma, 1990. 
45 Il Giornale, 20/12/1989. 
46 L. EINAUDI, Le politiche dell’immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a oggi, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2007, pp. 144-
148. 
47 SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA, Atti parlamentari. X Legislatura. 305° Seduta pubblica. 
Resoconto stenografico, Roma, 27.02.1990;  
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government and Presidency were the most resolute in pressing Italian authorities since, as 
emphasized by Gilbert Pérol, Ambassador of France to Rome, on the eve of the summit between the 
President of the French Republic, Mitterrand, and the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, 
Andreotti, which took place in Venice in late 1989,  
 
notre intérêt, […] n'est pas d'avoir, sur notre flanc méditerranéen oriental, le plus expose précisément à la 
pression démographique, un “pays-passoire”, […], ni un pays marginalisé avec lequel il faudrait maintenir, 
faute d'avoir pu maitriser le problème, une sorte de “cordon sanitaire” sur les Alpes. L'occasion nous en est 
fournie précisément par la négociation sur les accords de Schengen - quel que soit, en définitive, le sort de 
ces accords. Puisque l'Italie frappe à la porte, il faut [...] contraindre le Gouvernement italien, en l'enserrant 
dans un compte à rebours précis, à procéder à la nécessaire mise à jour de sa réglementation.48 
 
 At the same time, the Italian politicians who were more exposed to European influence such 
as European Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana publicly agreed with the authorities of the 
Schengen countries, especially the French ones, who refused to open borders with Italy unless Italy 
adopted stricter rules on immigration, including visas on persons from Southern Mediterranean 
countries.49 
 Foreign policy considerations, which came together with growing concerns over the impact 
of immigration on domestic political, economic and social dynamics, led to a dramatic shift from 
liberal to restrictive approach to immigration and from opposition to support for the Schengen 
Agreement in the main government parties.50 
At the conclusion of the parliamentary debate, the original decree law was radically 
modified and all the most significant reforms requested as conditions for the country's accession to 
the Schengen system were adopted.51 First, the Italian Parliament was pushed into abolishing the 
special clauses of the Geneva Convention in which the status of political asylum was only 
recognized for those from Eastern European Communist countries. Second, it was persuaded into 
strengthening rejection and detention procedures for irregular immigrants, tightening up sanctions 
for migrant smugglers and traffickers and introducing penalties on carriers transporting 
undocumented foreigners. Finally, it was reluctantly convinced to impose visas on citizens coming 
                                                 
48 ADN, CGF, 227 PO 1 291, Ambassade de France en Italie. Gilbert Pérol, Fiche télégraphique. Objet: Sommet 
Franco-Italien de Venise (4-5 Octobre 1989). Rencontre de M. le Président de la République avec M. Andreotti, 
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49 Il Messaggero, 24.02.1990. 
50 S. PAOLI, La legge Martelli su asilo politico e immigrazione: una scelta europea, in: Storia e Politica - Annali 
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51 See: C. BONIFAZI, European Migration Policy: Questions from Italy, in: R. KING, G. LAZARIDIS, C. 
TSARDANIDIS (eds.), Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke; New 
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 17 
from Turkey, Maghreb and sub-Saharan African countries52 at the same time that all Schengen 
countries, immediately after the collapse of Communist regimes and under pressure from West 
Germany, agreed on crossing out Hungary and Czechoslovakia from the Schengen Black List and, 
prior to the reunification, considering the German Democratic Republic as a non foreign country in 
relation to the Federal Republic of Germany, so de facto admitting East Germany into the Schengen 
system.53 
The Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement was signed by the five original 
signatories of the Schengen Agreement on June 19, 1990, while Italy signed both of them on 
November 27, 1990; on December 6, 1990 Italy signed a readmission agreement with France.  
 
 
CONCLUSION: 
A NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE ORIGINS OF THE SCHENGEN SYSTEM 
 
 The perceived failure and the high costs of national migration policies and the unexpected 
strength of constitutional, social and political obstacles to the adoption of restrictive policies at 
national level, were fundamental reasons why a group of member states of the EC, including 
France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, began to look for a Europe-
wide solution to the problem of the control of migration flows, especially from Southern 
Mediterranean countries. The Schengen Agreement and the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement, in this sense, primarily responded to the need to effectively protect the geopolitical core 
of Europe from unwanted immigration from the South while, simultaneously, reducing financial 
and political costs associated with large-scale border controls. 
 This is the first conclusion we drew from my researches on the origins of the Schengen 
agreements, especially the Italian case. On the one hand, political considerations were more 
important than economic factors in the decision to sign the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and the 
Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement in 1990 and the strengthening of external 
border controls, rather than relaxation and eventually abolition of internal border controls, was the 
primary motive behind these accords. On the other hand, the decision to act outside the context of 
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the EC was not primarily intended to put pressure on Great Britain, but to exclude the institutions of 
the European Community from the decision-making process on immigration and, more than this, to 
press Italy, Spain and to a lesser extent Greece and Portugal into adapting their migration policies to 
the more restrictive ones which were adopted and pursued in the Northern members of the EC. 
 The decision to sign the Schengen Agreement before the 1986 entry of Spain and Portugal 
into the Community and, as discussed in this article, the political decisions to exclude Italy from the 
1985 Schengen Agreement and to subordinate the Italy's signature of the Schengen agreements in 
1990 to the compliance with strict conditions whose terms were set out by the original members are 
clear evidences of the intention of the governments of Northern European countries to use Schengen 
as a means of pressure on Southern European countries. 
 Between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, in the founding members of the Schengen 
agreements, especially France, migration became a more and more politicized issue in the public 
space and the Mediterranean region began to be more and more perceived as a dangerous and 
potentially destabilising source of mass migration flows;54 in this context, the Southern members of 
the EC, especially Italy, were gradually seen and treated as a buffer area, a transit country to which 
patrols could be conveniently delegated and illegal aliens could be conveniently returned.  
 This is the second conclusion of our study. 
 After that readmission agreements and wider cooperation accords on migration were signed 
in the 1990s and the 2000s between members of the European Union (EU) and third Mediterranean 
countries, the concept of externalisation of European borders began to widely circulate in 
specialized literature.55 Generally speaking, this notion imply that, since the late 1990s, the 
European Union and its member states systematically tried to move the place where the control of 
travellers occurs from the border of the state into which the individual is seeking to enter to within 
the state of origin or transit. In an effort to reduce the number of persons entering irregularly while, 
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simultaneously, reducing political costs and bypassing legal constraints implicit in such an attempt, 
in other words, the EU and its member states delocalised frontiers to outsource border controls 
outside of their respective territories. 
In agreeing with this thesis, we argue that the strategy of externalization began much earlier 
than it is generally acknowledged; in particular, before being moved to origin and transit countries 
in Northern Africa, the Middle East and, to a certain extent, Eastern Europe, European border 
controls, especially Northern European border controls, were moved to Southern European transit 
countries.  
As discussed in this article, the requests to sign a preliminary readmission agreement with 
France, to adopt stricter immigration rules and policies and to impose visas on all emigration or 
potential emigration countries, which were made to Italy by the original signatories as part of the 
conditions to be met in order to enter the Schengen Agreement and the Convention implementing 
the Schengen Agreement, are clear evidences of the intention of the countries that formed the 
geopolitical core of the EC to use the Southern periphery as the first circle of their externalisation 
strategy; unlike non EC origin and transit countries, which were rewarded for their collaboration in 
controlling European borders with financial support, Italy and, afterwards, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece were rewarded for warding the Southern flank of the EC with the mere acceptance into the 
Schengen system. 
The main reason why, between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, Italy was so important in 
the migration strategy of the founding members of the Schengen agreements is quite obvious. Italy 
was, for both geographical and political reasons, the country most exposed to flows from Southern 
Mediterranean countries, which were considered as the most alarming source of illegal immigration 
and international terrorism in all Northern European countries, especially France. 
This is the third and last conclusion I arrived to.  
With very few exceptions,56 the multifaceted relationship between the establishment of the 
Schengen area, the external relations policy of the EC, later the EU, and the complex of Euro-
Mediterranean relations was largely neglected in both European and Mediterranean studies. In my 
view, however, the Schengen agreements ought to be primarily interpreted in terms of foreign 
policy, since they were first and foremost a political act directed at protecting the geopolitical core 
of the European Community from a security threat: unwanted mass immigration, especially from 
                                                 
56 See: M. CREMONA, J. MONAR, S. POLI, The External Dimension of the European Union’s Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, P.I.E Peter Lang, Brussels, 2011; P. J. CARDWELL, EU External Relations and 
Systems of Governance. The CFSP, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Migration, Routledge, Abingdon; New York, 
2009; N. RIBAS-MATEOS, Migration, Welfare & Borders. The Mediterranean in the Age of Globalization, 
Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick; London, 2005; S. COLLINSON, Shore to Shore: the politics of migration in 
Euro-Maghreb Relations, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1996. 
 20 
Southern Mediterranean states. To put it bluntly, third Mediterranean countries were the main 
targets of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and remained the main targets of the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement in 1990 even if, after the collapse of Communist regimes, 
immigration flows from the East were expected to outnumber those from the South.  
Significantly, at the same time when, between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Spain and 
Italy were constrained to introduce compulsory visas for people coming from the Mediterranean 
region in order to be admitted into the Schengen system, all the Schengen countries exempted a 
group of Central and Eastern European countries from visas and granted Eastern German citizens 
freedom of movement in the whole Schengen perimeter. 
 
 
 
